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CLD-240        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1097 
 ___________ 
 
 DARNELL PITTMAN SR., 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 B.A. BLEDSOE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00788) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 21, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES AND SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 19, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Darnell Pittman, Sr. appeals from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons below, we will summarily affirm. 
 While incarcerated at USP Lewisburg, Pittman was charged with threatening 
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another with bodily harm.  According to an incident report, Officers Young and Miller 
were conducting the 10:00 p.m. count on July 26, 2009, when they attempted to close the 
food slot on Pittman‟s cell.  Pittman pushed the food slot back open, made a motion like 
he was going to throw something, and yelled that he was “going to get you next week” 
and “going to throw” urine and feces on Officer Young.  As part of the investigation, 
Pittman was interviewed, advised of his rights, and provided with a copy of the incident 
report.  The investigating officer noted that Pittman‟s attitude was poor and that he stated 
that the report was “a lie.”  The investigating officer determined that the report was 
“justified and warranted.”  Pittman appeared before the Unit Disciplinary Committee 
(“UDC”), but declined to make a statement.  Based on the severity of the charges, the 
Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) referred the matter to the Disciplinary Hearing 
Officer (“DHO”).   
 Pittman appeared before the DHO on August 7, 2009, but requested that the 
hearing be postponed so that he could review videotape footage of the incident and obtain 
testimony from Officer Miller and two inmate witnesses.  The DHO granted Pittman‟s 
request, and the hearing was rescheduled for the morning of August 13, 2009.  In the 
interim, the DHO watched the videotape and contacted Officer Miller, who was 
unavailable to testify in person because he worked the evening shift.  Officer Miller 
prepared a written statement dated August 11, 2009.  At the rescheduled hearing, Pittman 
was assisted by a staff representative.  Pittman denied the allegations, maintaining that he 
“tripped on his shower shoes and fell into the wicket,” thereby making it appear that he 
slammed open the food slot door.  Pittman also presented the testimony of two inmate 
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witnesses who stated that they did not hear Pittman threaten Officer Young.   
 The DHO concluded that Pittman committed the prohibited act, noting that the 
charge was supported by the greater weight of the evidence.  In particular, the DHO 
stated that he relied on the written account of Officer Young, Officer Miller‟s 
memorandum, and the videotape footage, in which “Officer Young is observed leaping 
back from Pittman‟s cell door, to the left and rear.”  The DHO ordered Pittman to serve 
30 days of disciplinary segregation, disallowed 27 days of good conduct time, and 
imposed a loss of commissary privileges for 120 days.  The Bureau of Prisons denied 
Pittman‟s administrative appeal. 
 In April 2010, Pittman filed a § 2241 habeas petition challenging the loss of good 
conduct time, alleging the violation of his due process rights at the disciplinary hearing.  
In response, the Government argued that Pittman‟s disciplinary hearing complied with all 
that due process requires.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the habeas petition be 
denied, concluding that Pittman “received written notice of the charges against him not 
less tha[n] 24 hours before the hearing; was given a hearing before an impartial decision 
maker; was given a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and 
the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; and was allowed to call witnesses and 
present documentary evidence in his own defense.”  Over Pittman‟s objections, the 
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge‟s Report and Recommendation and denied 
the § 2241 petition.  Pittman appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous 
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standard to its findings of fact.  See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002). 
A complaint challenging the loss of good-time credits is cognizable under § 2241.  Queen 
v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 “[A] prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in good time credit.”  
Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, a prisoner facing the loss of 
good-conduct time as a result of an infraction is entitled to certain procedural protections 
in the disciplinary proceedings.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974).  The 
minimum required protections are: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 
charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional 
goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a 
written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 
disciplinary action.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  Notably, due 
process requires that an inmate be permitted to “present documentary evidence in his 
defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety 
or correctional goals.”  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.  “Although prison officials are afforded 
deference regarding whether evidence might be unduly hazardous or undermine 
institutional safety or correctional goals, „the discretion afforded prison officials is not 
without limits.‟”  Burns v. PA Dept. of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1400 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 Pittman argues that his due process rights were violated because the DHO failed to 
provide him with a copy of Officer Miller‟s August 11, 2009 statement and refused to 
allow him to view the videotape footage of the incident.  In support of these contentions, 
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Pittman cites 28 C.F.R. § 541.14(b)(2) (2010), which provides in relevant part that “the 
DHO shall give a copy of the investigation and other relevant materials to the inmate‟s 
staff representative for use in presentation on the inmate‟s behalf.”  Here, however, the 
DHO‟s report indicates that “both Pittman and his staff representative were made aware 
of the content of Officer Miller‟s statement during the hearing” and that the “video 
evidence was reviewed with Pittman.”1  For instance, the DHO “informed Pittman that 
[in] the video footage of the incident . . . the reporting officer is observed jumping back 
suddenly from the [cell] door, supporting the reporting officer‟s written account that it 
appeared to [him] that Pittman was going to throw something on the reporting officer.”  
Pittman had an opportunity to refute Officer Miller‟s statement and the videotape 
footage, and his objections were noted in the DHO‟s report.  Moreover, according to the 
DHO, Pittman stated at the hearing “that he made no specific requests of his staff 
representative.”  Under these circumstances, we conclude that no due process violation 
resulted from the DHO‟s refusal to allow Pittman to review Officer Miller‟s statement 
and view the videotape.  Cf. Burns, 642 F.3d at 174 (holding that “inmate‟s right to 
procedural due process is violated when a hearing examiner simply fails to view available 
evidence to determine its relevance and suitability for use at a disciplinary hearing.”). 
 Pittman also claims that the DHO violated his due process right to an impartial 
decision-making body by acting as an independent investigator, “fabricat[ing]” 
statements, and “clearly display[ing] a bias[ed] demeanor.”  In particular, Pittman 
                                                 
1
 The DHO‟s report also indicates that Pittman‟s staff representative “stated that he 
reviewed the video footage of the incident . . . [and] had no further information to 
present, nor statement to make, regarding the case.”   
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complains that the DHO took “it upon himself to review the video footage outside of the 
hearing,” thereby improperly “gain[ing] personal knowledge of the incident.”  But 
Pittman himself requested that the videotape footage be considered, and review of that 
footage did not transform the DHO into an investigator.  28 C.F.R. § 541.8(b) (providing 
that the “DHO will be an impartial decision maker who was not a victim, witness, 
investigator, or otherwise significantly involved in the incident.”).  Pittman also suggests 
that the DHO misrepresented his contact with Officer Miller.  As noted in the DHO‟s 
report, Officer Miller was unavailable to testify at the hearing on August 13, 2009, but 
submitted a statement dated August 11, 2009.  Pittman asserts that Officer “Miller never 
spoke to the DHO . . . until the day after” the hearing.  In support of this assertion, 
Pittman relies on a handwritten statement in which Officer Miller appears to indicate that 
he “did speak with DHO” on “Aug. 14, 2009.”  We agree with the District Court, 
however, that there is no inherent conflict--and certainly not one that raises due process 
concerns--between evidence indicating that Officer Miller prepared a written statement 
dated August 11, 2009, and also spoke with the DHO on August 14, 2009.  Pittman has 
pointed to no other evidence that would convince us that the DHO was biased or 
impartial.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 
this appeal.  See I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s 
judgment. 
